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PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE VIRGINIA STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS - A CALL FOR THE LEGISLATIVE
RESCUE SQUAD
Robert L Stevenson*
"It is the politicians whose minds have not been sufficiently pre-
pared for anything unfamiliar to their ancestors."
-John Maynard Keynes
In recent years a flood of federally-funded scientific break-
throughs have on almost a weekly basis established that some form
of cancer1 or other dreaded disease is "caused" by exposure to a
man-made product often not previously suspected of having a toxic
tendency.' Persons so afflicted then seek recovery from the product
* Professor of Law, T. C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond.
1. News reports seem sometimes to suggest that cancer in the United States is approach-
ing pandemic proportions. Fortunately the medical facts are to the contrary.
Next to lung cancer, which is caused by chemicals in cigarette smoke, cancers of
the colon (large intestine) and breast account for the greatest mortality, and these
two diseases have hardly changed in frequency for decades. Changes in other types of
cancer have occurred, however. Stomach cancer has been diminishing for several de-
cades - nobody knows why. The death rate from cancer of the cervix has also fallen
in the past thirty years. On the other hand, more deaths are being caused by cancers
of the pancreas and nervous system. The leukemias increased in frequency from 1930
to 1950, but have not changed much since then. These facts suggest that changing
environmental influences are at work, but they do not support the notion that our
increasingly industrialized environment has, so far, produced an epidemic of new can-
cers in the general population.
But just because epidemiologists do not yet see evidence of a big rise in cancer
deaths does not mean that it can't happen. Experience has taught us that there is a
delay period; as a rule cancer usually appears ten to thirty years after exposure be-
gins. A potent carcinogen brought into our chemical environment today would proba-
bly begin to show up as cancer deaths in the year 2000; a carcinogen introduced in
1960 could start to reveal itself any time now. The only way to be truly certain that a
new chemical is carcinogenic for people is to find out over a period of time that it
causes cancer. However, if the chemical were to produce cancer at fairly low rates, its
effect on people might be undetected because so many other causes can contribute to
the development of cancer.
G. JOHNSON & S. GOLDFINGER, HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL HEALTH LETrER BOOK 310 (1981).
2. The attempt to pin-point a single product as the "cause" of so complex a malady as
cancer may be erroneous. See, e.g., Gori, The Uncertain Business of Testing for Cancer,
Wall St. J., July 24, 1981, at 24, col. 3:
[C]ancer results from complex and vaguely understood interactions, and does not
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manufacturer.3 Their basis in tort is either for negligence in pro-
ducing so harmful (and thus defective) a product, or for having
failed to warn of the danger, or for "strict liability" within Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Where, as in Virginia,
there is uncertainty as to the acceptance of Section 402A as a mat-
ter of state law,4 an alternative basis is under the Uniform Corn-
stem from discrete causes, as it is with flu or measles. Among the many factors that
determine cancer, genetics is important. Different animal species, and even individu-
als within a species, can be suspectible or resistant, the final outcome being further
influenced by diet, unknown contaminants, stress, diseases, natural radiation and
many other disturbances of unpredictable dimensions.
Historically, however, mankind often seems more adept at discovering "causes" of termi-
nal diseases than "cures." In the Middle Ages when Europe was decimated by the bubonic
plague, physicians at the prestigious University of Paris attributed the cause to a "triple
conjunction of Saturn, Jupiter and Mars in the 40th degree of Aquarius." B. TUCHMAN, A
DISTANT MIRROR - THE CALAMrrous 14TH CENTURY 106 (1978).
In addition to such standard afflictions as cancer, researchers sometimes unearth the
"cause" of disorders which are themselves medically obscure. For example, during 1980, lab-
oratory tests seemed to indicate that a rare, but serious malady known as toxic shock syn-
drome may be "caused" by certain tampons used in feminine hygiene. Subsequent scientific
studies may prove the initial scare was as ill-founded as the 1981 coffee flurry involving
pancreatic cancer. See Wall St. J., June 26, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
3. Nationwide, the quantity of this type of products liability litigation is staggering. In
early 1980, it was estimated that there were pending nationally more than 3,000 asbestosis
cases and that there were at least 500,000 more workers "at risk." Practicing Law Institute
Seminar in New York City on Toxic Substances Litigation, reported in [1980] 8 PROD.
SAFETY & LiAB. REP. (BNA) 142.
The damage claims are similarly staggering. In a class action consolidating the 1,500 fed-
eral cases involving the Dalcon Shield birth control device, the United States District Court
noted that compensatory damages claimed exceed $500 million. In re "Dalcon Shield"
I.U.D. Products Liability Litigation, (N.D. Cal. June 25, 1981), reported in [1981] 9 PROD.
SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 570. The defendant in that lawsuit has reported that the
amount claimed as punitive damages in all such suits aggregates $2.35 billion. Richmond
Times-Dispatch, Aug. 2, 1981, § F, at 12, col. 4.
4. Some commentators extol what has been referred to as the Virginia system of "strict
liability in contract." See Speidel, The Virginia "Anti-Privity" Statute: Strict Products Li-
ability Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 VA. L. REv. 804 (1965). Others believe this
an inadequate substitute for § 402A. See Note, Virginia Should Adopt Strict Tort Recovery
in Prodcts Liability Suits Involving Personal Injury, 14 U. RICH. L. REv. 391 (1980).
Both systems appear to have serious flaws as a matter of sound products liability law. For
example, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) allows the seller to exclude the implied war-
ranty of merchantability, and this is routinely accomplished in the sale of high cost items.
And § 402A, by eliminating the element of fault as the basic ingredient of liability, opens
the door to an unprincipled reaching for a "deep pocket" with a lack of concern for the fact
that it is the consumer who eventually shoulders the cost. Ordinary negligence law also is
flawed in a state such as Virginia which insists on retaining the "all or nothing" approach of
the contributory negligence defense rather than adopting the modern theory of comparative
fault. The Virginia law reports are replete with cases holding that a plaintiff cannot recover
in tort if he has himself been negligent. Where, however, a jury determines that the defen-
dant's fault has been substantial, it is likely to overlook some lesser degree of fault on the
part of the plaintiff-though it may utilize this factor in reducing the recovery. If this
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mercial Code (UCC) for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantibility as to the fitness of the product for ordinary
purposes.5
Typically it is a disease such as asbestosis that remains latent for
many years' and during the dormant period lacks symptoms dis-
cernible to the medical profession, let alone to the laity.7 The date
surmise is accurate, then there exists a comparative fault doctrine in fact, if not in legal
theory.
5. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-314 (Added Vol. 1965). In products liability practice in Vir-
ginia, a plaintiff's complaint routinely includes a count for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantibility. Thereafter, however, when such a case comes to trial, plaintiff's counsel just
as routinely seems to concentrate exclusively on the elements of tort law. The complexity,
because of the multiplicity of the several causes of action, is understandably bewildering to
juries. Accordingly, it is questionable whether the implied warranty count is a worthwhile
ingredient in such actions.
6. See, e.g., Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F. 2d 1128, 1133 (5th Cir. 1981), where
Circuit Judge Coleman discussed the difficulties regarding manifestation:
Continuous breathing of asbestos-laden air will cause an eventual concentration of
the particles in the lung tissue. Once in the lung, the particles cannot be coughed out
and remain there permanently. The noxious effect of these rock particles causes the
body to set up an inflammation until eventually fibrosis occurs. Through fibrosis the
body lays down scar tissue in the lung surrounding the asbestos fibers. With a large
concentration of the fibers lodged in the lung cavities, scar tissue eventually replaces
most of the healthy lung tissue, disrupting the intake of air into lung air sacs and
causing a shortness of breath. A sufficiently high concentration and buildup of the
condition will cause death. This process, called asbestosis, can also be a precipitating
cause of other illnesses such as emphysema, bronchitis, and pneumonia.
Asbestosis is a cumulative and progressive disease. It does not occur overnight after
breathing in a substantial number of asbestos particles during the day. Rather, the
disease is a culmination of body reaction to the particles inhaled during years of ex-
posure. The disease is slow in nature and may require from ten to twenty years from
onset to fully manifest itself. Persons may develop asbestosis long after they have left
contact with an asbestos environment. Continuous exposure to asbestos particles,
however, prods the disease at a greater rate. Even though the body has begun a reac-
tion to the fibers, inhalation of new fibers adds to the lung inflammation and acceler-
ates injury. Due to this progressive nature, it is generally quite difficult, if not impos-
sible, to assign manifestation of the disease to a specific date.
7. For some of the leading medical literature on asbestosis, see Selikoff, Bader, Bader,
Churg & Hammond, Asbestosis and Neoplasis, 42 AM. J. MED. 487 (1967); Selikoff, Churg &
Hammond, The Occurrence of Asbestosis among Insulation Workers, 132 ANN. N.Y. ACAD.
Sci. 139 (1965). As an egregious modern instance, consider the many current lawsuits involv-
ing the synthetic drug, diethystilbestrol, otherwise known as DES. Commencing in 1947,
this prescription drug was used to prevent miscarriages until it was discovered in 1971 that
some-but not all-prenatally exposed daughters of mothers who had taken DES develop
cancerous vaginal abnormalities, which appear sometime after puberty. As a result, approxi-
mately 1,000 lawsuits have been filed against DES manufacturers. See Podgers, DES Ruling
Shakes Products Liability Field, 66 A.B.A. J. 827 (1980).
So that DES sons won't feel discriminated against, researchers in 1980 were attempting to
establish that if the sons were having infertility problems, their difficulty could be traced to
the DES their mothers had taken during pregnancy. If so established, it will be interesting
in jurisdictions having the "discovery" test for limitation accrual purposes to determine the
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:323
of the fateful exposure is usually not ascertainable because the
plaintiff typically has been in the vicinity of the toxic product for a
decade or more. And though the incubation period of the disease
may be known medically within at least a broad range, that period
will vary widely in individual cases. After a particular victim's dis-
ease becomes medically detectable, the date of diagnosis depends
upon the expertise of the particular physician in what often is
medically an esoteric area, and that date may itself precede the
time when the person had any reason to suspect that he had a
health problem and a need to consult a doctor.
Because of these medical peculiarities, lawsuits to recover for
such injuries raise difficult legal questions regarding the statute of
limitations. Although the problem is not new to the law,8 the diffi-
culties have multiplied with the recent explosion of products liabil-
ity lawsuits following each revelation of another allegedly toxic
product. In Virginia, the snarls have been exacerbated because in
suits brought in tort, the only mechanism for coping with a limita-
tions problem is a statute which is substantially the same as the
one enacted by the English Parliament in 1623 o in a period when it
was a medical novelty to learn that the blood circulates. The re-
sults from applying so antique 0 a mechanism to so modern a
earliest date when the sons should have discovered their infertility.
8. The issue surfaced initially in workmen's compensation situations such as Urie v.
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 170 (1949). There, a locomotive fireman had to contend with a
statute of limitations defense in a suit to recover under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
for the pulmonary disease he had developed from inhalation of silica dust during his thirty
years of employment by the railroad. It was held that the lawsuit was not time-barred on
the ground that the limitation clock did not commence running until such time as "the
accumulated effects of the deleterious substance manifested themselves to the individual
plaintiff." See generally, Estep & Allan, Radiation Injuries and Time Limitations in Work-
men's Compensation Cases, 62 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1963).
9. The original English statute was an Act for Limitations of Actions and for Avoiding
Suits in Law, 1623, 21 Jac. I, ch. 16, § 3, IV Part II. St. of Realm 12.22. It barred certain
designated lawsuits if not instituted within six years "after the cause of actions or suit." In
Virginia, the first limitations statute, 1 VA. REV. CODE 488 (1819), reiterated the 1623 stat-
ute, but reduced the period to five years. Thirty years later, in VA. CODE § 11 (1849), the
provision was reworded to bar actions brought more than five years "after the right to bring
the action shall have accrued." Thereafter, no further changes were made until 1954 when
the provision was amended to read: "Every action for personal injuries shall be brought
within two years next after the right to bring the action shall have accrued." VA. CODE ANN.
§ 24 (1954). Such provision today is found-virtually without change-in VA. CODE ANN. §
8-01.243(A) (Repl. Vol. 1977). See note 11 infra.
10. The purpose of Parliament's enacting the 1623 Act is obscure. Some commentators
have inferred that it was enacted "primarily to keep out of the King's courts what might be
considered inconsequential claims, and incidentally, to minimize the hardship which suit in
the King's courts imposed on poor defendants." Developments in the Law: Statutes of Lim-
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medico-legal problem are as curious as if a Virginia manufacturer
were today operating its furniture factory with only the unsophisti-
cated wood-working tools in use at the founding of the Virginia
colony, or if capital punishment in the state were still carried out
via the headsman's axe used in 1618 in the execution of Sir Walter
Raleigh.
In suits for personal injuries based on tort, section 8.01-243(A) of
the Virginia Code replicates the original 1623 statute by starting
the ticking of the limitations clock on the date when "the cause of
action shall have accrued." '11 But whereas today most jurisdictions
do not commence the ticking until the plaintiff discovered his tor-
tious injury, or should reasonably have discovered it, 12 section 8.01-
230 of the Virginia Code -as in effect since 1977 has banned use of
the "discovery" test.13 And unlike many other states, Virginia has
itations, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1177, 1178 (1950). If so, this purpose seems at odds with modem
products liability lawsuits which, when brought against manufacturers of harmful products,
are not usually "inconsequential" claims and do not involve financially "poor" defendants.
Over the course of three centuries, society's attitudes toward personal injury claims have,
of course, changed materially. See Kelley, The Discovery Rule for Personal Injury and
Statutes of Limitations: Reflections on the British Experience, 24 WAYNE L. REv. 1641
(1978).
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-243(A) (Repl. Vol. 1977) reads: "Unless otherwise provided by
statute, every action for personal injuries, whatever the theory of recovery, . . . shall be
brought within two years next after the cause of action shall have accrued." (emphasis
added).
12. Modern courts have said that the purpose of the traditional statute of limitations is
"to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time." Street v. Consumers
Mining Corp., 185 Va. 561, 575, 39 S.E.2d 271, 277 (1946). Because the "discovery" rule
accords with this purpose of penalizing only a dilatory plaintiff, that rule has been adopted
in most jurisdictions. See McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622 F.2d 657 (3rd Cir.
1980); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F. 2d 1073 (5th Cir. 1976); Karjala v.
Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975); Williams v. Borden, Inc., 637 F.2d
731 (10th Cir. 1980); Withers v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 878 (S.D. Ind. 1970); Nolan
v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 IMI. 2d 161, 421 N.E.2d 864 (1981); Miller v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 204 Kan. 184, 460 P.2d 535 (1969); Louisville Trust Co. v. Johns-Manville Prod.
Corp., 580 S.W.2d 497 (Ky. 1979); Harig v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394
A.2d 299 (1978); Cannon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 374 Mass. 739, 374 N.E.2d 582 (1978);
Acker v. Sorenson, 183 Neb. 866, 165 N.W.2d 74 (1969); Raymond v. Eli Lilly & Co., 117
N.H. 164, 371 A.2d 170 (1977); Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248
N.E.2d 871, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969); Iverson v. Lancaster, 158 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1968);
Frohs v. Greene, 253 Or. 1, 452 P.2d 564 (1969); Wilkinson v. Harrington, 104 R.I. 1224, 243
A.2d 745 (1968).
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-230 (Repl. Vol. 1977) provides:
In every action for which a limitation period is prescribed, the cause of action shall
be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation period shall begin to run from the
date the injury is sustained in the case of injury to the person ... and not when the
resulting damage is discovered .... (emphasis added).
In connection with the recodification of what is now Title 8.01, the Virginia Code Coin-
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not in products liability cases enacted a "statute of repose," which
as a matter of substantive law imposes an outside cut-off date be-
yond which no lawsuit may be instituted, irrespective of the ac-
crual date of the cause of action.14
Following the 1977 revision of what is now Title 8.01 of the Vir-
ginia Code, the first products liability case involving a limitations
defense to reach the Virginia Supreme Court was Locke v. Johns-
mission in 1977 had recommended a "discovery" test in products liability cases. This took
the form of a proposed § 8.01-249(4), which would in such cases have kept the limitation
clock from ticking "until the injury or damage resulting therefrom is discovered or by the
exercise of due diligence reasonably should have been discovered." The Commission stated
that: "This change is more equitable to the plaintiff and addresses itself to the problem of
latent defects and slow-developing injuries which may be discoverable only after the injury
has occurred." VA. H.D. Doc. No. 14, 1977 Sess. 158-60. The Senate, however, rejected the
proposal. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Feb. 3, 1977, § D, at 5. As a consequence, when later
in 1977 the General Assembly enacted the anti-discovery rule in § 8.01-230, it in effect pre-
empted to itself any future changes in this area of the law.
14. RESTATEMENT (SECOND). OF TORTS § 899, Comment g, at 445 (1979) reads:
In recent years special "statutes of repose" have been adopted in some states cover-
ing particular kinds of activity .... These statutes set a designated event for the
statutory period to start running and then provide that at the expiration of the pe-
riod any cause of action is barred regardless of usual reasons for "tolling" . . . . The
statutory period in these acts is usually longer than that for the regular statute of
limitations, but, depending upon the designated event starting the running of the
statute, it may have run before a cause of action came fully into existence ....
In 1980, the Joint Subcommittee of the House and Senate Committees for Courts of Jus-
tice on Products Liability had recommended enactment of a six-year "statute of repose" in
products liability actions. See VA. H.D. Doc. No. 14, 1980 Sess. The proposal was that the
Virginia Code be amended by adding the following:
§ 8.01-246.1. Personal actions based on defective products.- Notwithstanding when
the cause of action shall have occurred:
1. No action for the recovery of damages or for contribution or indemnity, for dam-
ages for personal injury, death or damage to property which based on negligence or
upon Part 2 of Title 8.2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, arising out of the design,
inspection, testing, marketing or manufacturing of a product or arising out of any
alleged failure to warn or any alleged failure to properly instruct concerning the use
of a product or upon any alleged breach of warranty, expressed or implied, shall be
commenced later than six years after the manufacturer of the final product parted
with its possession and control, or sold it, whichever occurred last.
2. Any action for personal injury, death or damage to property, arising out of a
federal or State statute, rule or regulation requiring a manufacturer of a product to
alter, repair, recall, inspect or issue warnings or instructions or to otherwise take any
action or precaution for the benefit of persons who might be injured or damaged by
using the product, which requirement arose after the manufacturer parted with pos-
session and control of the product or sold it, whichever came last, must be com-
menced no later than six years after the manufacturer first came under the duty to
alter, repair, recall, inspect or issue warnings or instructions about the product or
otherwise to take any action or precaution for the benefit of persons using the
product.
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Manville Corp.15 The plaintiff, Douglas Locke, had been an indus-
trial electrician who claimed to have contracted a latent case of
mesothelioma while employed from 1948 to 1972 on a number of
construction projects in Virginia, New York and North Carolina.
This is a terminal carcinogenic disease of the lungs which derived,
he claimed, as the result of inhalation of harmful emissions from
asbestos insulation products manufactured by several defendants.16
He first experienced lung difficulties in November of 1977; his dis-
ease was medically diagnosed in the spring of 1978; and his lawsuit
was instituted that summer. In the Circuit Court for the City of
Richmond, the defendants had successfully contended that the ac-
tion was time-barred no later than two years after the date (1972)
when the plaintiff had last been exposed to the product.1 The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court, however, disagreed. Under the circumstances
it rejected as the tort accrual date the "time of the wrong" on the
ground that no matter how careless a defendant's conduct may
have been and no matter how ultimately injurious it may prove to
be, it only is tortious when someone because of it sustains a legally
provable injury."' Instead, the court, citing section 8.01-230 of the
Virginia Code, adopted a tort accrual rule under which in a dor-
mant illness situation the limitation period does not start running
until the plaintiff's illness could medically have been diagnosed.19
15. 221 Va. 951, 275 S.E.2d 900 (1981).
16. Id. at 953, 275 S.E.2d at 902. See JOHNSON & GOLDFINGER, supra note 1, at 167:
Mesothelioma, another type of cancer, occurs mainly in people exposed to asbestos
dust. These tumors arise from the membrane that lines the chest or abdominal cav-
ity, and they are highly malignant. Although they are rare, mesotheliomas can occur
even after a limited exposure to asbestos dust and may affect people who were not
directly involved in handling the material, such as relatives of asbestos workers. A
very long time - forty years or more - can elapse between exposure and the appear-
ance of mesothelioma, although many cases appear earlier.
17. 221 Va. at 955, 275 S.E.2d at 903. For a recent comparable holding, see Neubauer v.
Owens-Coming Fiberglass, 504 F. Supp. 1210 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
18. 221 Va. at 957-59, 275 S.E.2d at 904-05. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899,
Comment c, at 441 (1979):
Statutes of limitations ordinarily provide that an action may be commenced only
within a specified period after the cause of action arises. Although the courts have not
been consistent in applying this limitation strictly, the interpretation of the statute as
applied to torts has been such that the statute does not usually begin to run until the
tort is complete .... A tort is ordinarily not complete until there has been an inva-
sion of a legally protected interest of the plaintiff.
See also F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 25.1, at 1300 (1956); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §
30, at 133 (4th ed. 1971).
19. 221 Va. at 959, 275 S.E.2d at 905. A comparable holding is Cartledge v. Jopling, [1962]
1 Q.B. 189 (C.A.), aff'd, [1963] A.C. 758. There, a limitation defense was raised against suits
by industrial workers who had developed pneumonoconiosis as the result of a long-time
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The result of so unusual a tort accrual rule seems problemati-
cal.2 0 At best, it poses a thorny question for courts and juries to
resolve, and one where if there are the usual conflicts in medical
expert testimony, the so-called "sympathy" element may play a
significant role. At worst, the medical diagnosis accrual rule could
bar a plaintiff's suit before he had reason to suspect that he had a
physical condition which required medical attention - thus oper-
ating as in effect a judicially-created "statute of repose."
Esoteric legal rules such as the accrual rule adopted in Locke
have a way of generating in their wake many other puzzling legal
questions. For example, in such a disease-related products liability
lawsuit, it could be a problem to determine which state's substan-
tive law to apply. Traditionally this has been the law of the state
"where the injury occurred. ' 21 Pursuant to the Locke rule, the de-
fendant's act only becomes tortious when the latent disease first
becomes medically diagnosable. If such diagnosis should occur
outside Virginia, it is possible that the diagnostic state's substan-
tive law could be applicable. If Virginia accepted the "dominant
contacts" rule, Virginia could, of course, be deemed the state with
the most significant relationship to the cause of action because it
was the state of the plaintiff's residence, and because it was one of
the three states where the plaintiff was exposed to the toxic sub-
stance. But Virginia has firmly rejected the uncertainties of the
"dominant contacts" rule.22
In addition to such a conflicts of law puzzle, the Locke rule could
generate a problem of jurisdiction over a defendant which was not
"doing business" in Virginia. If because of medical diagnosis in an-
other state the tort becomes completed there, the Virginia "long-
arm" statute might be constitutionally insufficient to afford juris-
inhalation of dust-laden air. The suits were held to be time-barred on the basis that the
limitation clock had commenced ticking when the disease first became medically discovera-
ble by X-ray. The injustice of the Cartledge holding was noted by Parliament, which almost
immediately enacted a "discovery" test in personal injury claims. See The Limitation Act,
1963, c.47.
20. The rule is unlikely to have any effect upon the numerous shipyard worker asbestosis
cases presently pending in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia. That conclusion seems to follow from a recent ruling by the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit that such a case is not governed by state substantive law, but falls instead
within the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts and therefore is not subject to any
state statute of limitations. White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1981).
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (1964).
22. See McMillan v. McMillan, 219 Va. 1127, 1130, 253 S.E.2d 662, 644 (1979) (tort action
in which the "dominant contacts" test was deemed too susceptible to inconsistency).
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diction over the otherwise non-present defendant.23
Locke also involved a warranty claim for the same injury, but
the Virginia Supreme Court seemingly did not reach this aspect of
the statute of limitations.24 Here the accrual problem is not gov-
erned by section 8.01-230 of the Virginia Code, but by section 8.2-
725, which comprises a part of the UCC.2 5 Even though subsection
(1) of the latter section prescribes a four-year period, the limita-
tion period for products liability personal injury actions in Virginia
has been recently reduced to two years." And although subsection
(2) of section 8.2-725 contains a "discovery" test, the test is appli-
23. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(3) (Repl. Vol. 1977). See also International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
24. In the Virginia Supreme Court's opinion in the Locke case, Justice Compton stated
that the limitation issue was "governed by Code §§ 8.01-243(A) and -230." 221 Va. at 955,
275 S.E.2d at 903 (emphasis added). Though both sections are applicable to tort actions,
§ 8.01-230 is not applicable to warranty actions because of the following exclusion at the
end of § 8.01-230: "except where ... otherwise provided under. . . other statute." As ap-
pears from the Revisers' Notes, the term "other statute" was intended to have reference to
8.2-725, which comprises a part of the UCC as adopted in Virginia.
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-725 (Repl. Vol. 1977) is the standard UCC version. It reads:
(1) An action for breach of any contract of sale must be commenced within four years
after the cause of action has accrued ...
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved
party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of
delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future perform-
ance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such perform-
ance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.
Rapp v. Whitlock Equip. Corp., 222 Va. 80, 279 S.E.2d 133 (1981)-seemingly without
statutory support-reads a privity requirement into § 8.2-725 so as to avoid subjecting a
plaintiff who is a third party beneficiary to that section's warranty limitation provisions.
Instead, the court applies the general contractual limitations presently found in § 8.01-245
without any discussion of the still prevalent warranty accrual problem. A commentator has
characterized another state court's similar conclusion as-with tongue in cheek-"a dazzling
display of reasoning." See T. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW
DIGEST § 2-725 [A][10][b], at 2-525 (1978). It is conceivable that an implied warranty law-
suit might hereafter arise which was brought by both the buyer and by third party benefi-
ciary for personal injuries sustained more than two years after the date of purchase. Pre-
sumably the Rapp case rationale, if extended to personal injury situations, would bar the
buyer's cause of action, but would not bar that brought by the third party beneficiary.
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246 (Repl. Vol. 1977), after designating limitation periods for
various actions based on contract, reads: "Provided that as to any action. to which § 8.2-725
of the Uniform Commercial Code is applicable, that section shall be controlling except that
in products liability actions for injury to person ... the [two year] limitation prescribed in
§ 8.01-243 shall apply."
The proviso reflects Virginia law in effect before the UCC became operative in the state
on January 1, 1966. See, e.g., Friedman v. Peoples Serv. Drug Stores, Inc., 208 Va. 700, 160
S.E.2d 563 (1968). It also reflects a ruling in a federal diversity case which arose after the
UCC had become effective in Virginia. See Tyler v. R. R. Street & Co., 322 F. Supp. 541
(E.D. Va., 1971).
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cable only to certain express warranties and not to implied warran-
ties, which are the norm in products liability cases.2 7 The thrust of
the UCC, therefore, is that regardless of an aggrieved party's lack
of knowledge, his cause of action for breach of implied warranty
accrues at the time the seller tendered delivery of the product to
the buyer.28 Accordingly, in a disease-related products liability
lawsuit, an implied warranty cause of action can be time-barred by
the UCC limitations even before (a) the plaintiff sustained a prove-
able injury, or (b) his exposure, or (c) his illness could medically
have been diagnosed.2e
If Virginia tort and warranty law is to escape from this morass,
the General Assembly must provide the rescue. Section 8.01-230
should be amended to make the "date of injury" accrual provisions
applicable not only as they are now to tort, but also to personal
injury actions for breach of implied warranty.8 0 This will reinstate
the Virginia rule which antedated the adoption of the UCC. 1 In
addition, there should be enacted a double-barreled approach to
the limitations problem that will, in products liability actions for
27. The cases from other jurisdictions are legion holding that under § 2-275(2) of the
UCC only an express warranty "explicitly extends to future performance." See Annot. 93
A.L.R.3d 690 (1979). That result follows from the fact that an implied warranty is inferred
and thus is outside the "explicit extension" exception in § 2-275(2). See note 25 supra.
There are products liability cases involving express warranties. See Winston Indus. v. Stuy-
vesant Ins. Co., 55 Ala. App. 525, 317 So. 2d 493 (1975). They are, however, as rare as
summer snowstorms in Virginia.
28. In products liability cases, § 8.2-725 reverses the rule which in pre-UCC days had
prevailed in the state. See for example Caudill v. Wise Rambler, Inc., 210 Va. 11, 168 S.E.2d
257 (1969), which held that a plaintiff's cause of action to recover for a personal injury
resulting from the breach of a common law implied warranty accrued for limitation pur-
poses as of the date of the injury rather than from the date of the sale of the warranted
product.
29. When in 1951 the UCC was submitted for legislative enactment, it was not antici-
pated that it would have any particular impact in the area of products liability law. It was in
this period that the provision which is now § 8.2-725 of the Virginia Code was written with
an eye primarily to long-established commercial aspects of the law of sales. It was not until
the 1960's that the citadel of privity fell and was incorporated into the UCC in the form of
the third party beneficiary provision. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (Added Vol. 1965). Though
this allows the UCC to have a products liability aspect, the same does not mesh comfortably
with the commercial law limitation provisions of § 8.2-725. Today, this lack of mesh is im-
material in most states because the wide-spread adoption in tort of the "strict liability"
doctrine has, by eliminating contributory negligence, made tort law the normal legal basis in
products liability litigation. In Virginia, however, it is significant. Because of the uncertainty
as to the viability in Virginia of the "strict liability" doctrine as promulgated in § 402A of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs, the UCC has a role in products liability cases in this
state.
30. See note 13 supra for the text of VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-230 (Repl. Vol. 1977).
31. See note 26 supra.
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personal injuries, combine a "discovery" test for accrual with a
ten-year "statute of repose" comparable to that recently enacted in
this area by many states.3 2 The "discovery" test will correct the
inequities to plaintiffs inherent in the absence of such a test and
yet will bar any plaintiff who "sleeps on his rights."' And a "stat-
ute of repose" will correct the inequities to defendants3 4 implicit in
any products liability lawsuit where they are adjudged today for
32. See 5 ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (Supp. 1982) ("10 years after the manufactured product is
first put to use"); 4 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1982) ("twelve years after the product
was first sold for use or consumption"); 6 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (Supp. 1980)
("[tlen years after a product is first sold for use or consumption"); 27 CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-577a (West Supp. 1981) ("ten years from the date that such party last parted
with possession or control of the product"); 29 GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106 (Cum. Supp. 1981)
("10 years from the date of the first sale for use or consumption"); IDAHO CODE § 6-
1303(2)(a) (Supp. 1981) ("harm caused more than ten (10) years after time of delivery, a
presumption arises that the harm was caused after the useful life had expired"); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 83, §-22.2(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) ("12 years from the date of first sale, lease
or delivery of possession by a seller or 10 years from the date of first sale, lease or delivery
of possession to its initial user, consumer or other non-seller, whichever period expires ear-
lier"); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-5 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1981) ("ten [10] years after the
delivery of the product to the initial user"); 4A KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(b) (1976) ("ten
years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action"); 7 Ky. REV. STAT. §
411.310(1) (Supp. 1979) ("five (5) years after the date of sale to the first consumer or more
than eight (8) years after the date of manufacture"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224 (1978) ("ten
years after the date when the product which allegedly caused the personal injury, death, or
damage was first sold or leased for use"); 4A N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2 (Supp. 1979)
("12 years after the manufacturer of the final product parted with its possession and control
or sold it, whichever occurred last"); 5A N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02 (Supp. 1981) ("within
ten years of the date of initial purchase for use or consumption, or within eleven years of the
date of manufacture"); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905(1) (1979) ("eight years after the date on
which the product was first purchased for use or consumption"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-13(b)
(Supp. 1981) ("[actions] shall be commenced within ten (10) years after the date the prod-
uct was first purchased for use or consumption"); S.D. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp.
1981) ("six years after the date of the delivery of the completed product to its first pur-
chaser or lessee who was not engaged in the business of selling such product"); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-28-103 (Supp. 1980) ("ten years from the date on which the product was first
purchased for use or consumption, or within one year after the expiration of the anticipated
life of the product, whichever is the shorter"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (Repl. Vol. 1977)
("six years after the date of initial purchase for use or consumption or ten years after the
date of manufacture"). See also 2 PROD. LiuB. REP. (CCH) 94,926 (quoting amendment to
WASH. REV. CODE § 3158 (effective July 26, 1981)) ("no claim ... may be brought more
than three years from the time the claimant discovered or in the exercise of due diligence
should have discovered the harm and its cause").
Comparable statutes also have been enacted in Florida and North Carolina but have since
been held to be unconstitutional. Though similarly challenged, Illinois, Mississippi and Ten-
nessee statutes have been held not to be constitutionally deficient. See generally McGovern,
The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM.
U.L. REV. 579 (1981).
33. See note 13 supra for the 1977 recommendations of the Virginia Code Commission.
34. See note 14 supra for the 1980 recommendations of the Joint Subcommittee of the
House and Senate Committees for Courts of Justice on Products Liability.
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conduct occurring a decade or more ago.3"
To illustrate the effect of such a suggested legislative program,"6
suppose thereafter a so-called DES daughter 7 were to institute a
Virginia products liability lawsuit against the manufacturer which,
more than a decade ago had supplied DES to her pregnant mother.
In that lawsuit, the plaintiff's cause of action-either in tort or in
implied warranty-would be deemed to have accrued when she
discovered (or should have discovered) her injury, but would in
any event-irrespective of the accrual date of the cause of ac-
tion-be time-barred because it had not-and could not-have
been instituted within ten years after the drug had been sold to
her mother."' Yet, a suit instituted by an asbestos worker eight
years after he had terminated his employment with a company and
had ended his exposure to asbestos would not be barred under the
suggested legislative program even if his disease could have been
medically diagnosed ten years earlier.
35. Predictably, a "statute of repose" evokes strong arguments pro and con. Compare
DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PRODUCTS LABLiTY POSITroN PAPER 20 (1976), and Massery,
Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation-A New Immunity for Product Suppliers, 1977 INS.
L.J. 535 with Lambert, Trends in Products Liability Litigation, 16 TRIAL MAG. 82, 86
(1980), and Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Products Liability Act-A
Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221, 243 (1978-79).
36. See Appendix for suggested changes.
37. See note 7 supra.
38. Maladies induced by DES apparently do not surface and cannot be diagnosed until
more than a decade after the victim's mother took the drug to avoid a miscarriage. Given
therefore a "statute of repose" with a ten year cut-off, the daughter's claim would be barred
even before her cause of action accrued. This result would, of course, be anomalous if found
in a statute of limitations which is intended only to penalize dilatory plaintiffs. The result
does, however, comport with the purpose of a 'statute of repose," which says that as a
matter of policy there should be a specific time beyond which a defendant should no longer
be subjected to protracted liability. Thus a "statute of repose" is intended as a substantive
definition of rights as distinguished from a procedural limitation on the remedy used to
enforce rights.
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE VIRGINIA CODE*
§ 8.01-230. Accrual of cause of action.
A. Except as otherwise provided in subsection B hereof, [I]n every
action for which a limitation period is prescribed, the cause of ac-
tion shall be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation period
shall begin to run from the date the injury is sustained in the case
of injury to the person, when the breach on contract or duty occurs
in the case of damage to property and not when the resulting dam-
age is discovered, except where the relief sought is solely equitable
or where otherwise provided under § 8.01-233, subsection C of §§
8.01-245, 8.01-249, or 8.01-250.
B. In every products liability action for personal injuries or for
damage to property (other than to the product itself), the cause
of action shall, whatever the theory of recovery, be deemed to ac-
crue and the prescribed limitation period shall begin to run from
the date the aggrieved party discovered the injury or damage and
its probable wrongful cause, or should reasonably have discovered
the same.
Explanation of Suggested Changes in § 8.01-230. The
deletion in subsection A would in products liability lawsuits make
applicable the "date of injury" tort accrual provisions of § 8.01-230
rather than those of § 8.2-275 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
The provisions of subsection B would incorporate into § 8.01-230 a
"discovery" test in all products liability actions, whatever the the-
ory of recovery.
§ 8.01-243. Personal action for injury to person or property
generally.
A. Unless otherwise provided by statute, every action for personal
injuries, whatever the theory of recovery, except as provided in
subsections B and C hereof, shall be brought within two years af-
ter the cause of action accrued.
B. Every action for injury to property, including actions by a par-
ent or guardian of an infant against a tort-feasor for expenses of
curing or attempting to cure such infant from the result of a per-
sonal injury or loss of services of such infant, shall be brought
* Italicized portions represent the author's proposals.
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within five years next after the cause of action shall have accrued.
C. Every products liability action for personal injuries or for
damage to property (other than to the product itself) shall,
whatever the theory of recovery, be brought within ten years after
the product was first sold or leased for use or consumption.
Explanation of Suggested Changes in § 8.01-243. Sub-
section C would impose a ten-year "statute of repose" in every
products liability action, whatever the theory of recovery, com-
mencing from the date the product was first sold or leased for use
or consumption.
§ 8.2-725. Statute of limitations in contracts for sale.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in § 8.01-246, and subject to
subsection C of § 8.01-243, [A]n action for breach of any contract
for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of
action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may re-
duce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not
extend it.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsection B of § 8.01-230,
[A] cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of
the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of
warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that
where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the
goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such per-
formance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should
have been discovered.
(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by sub-
section (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by an-
other action for the same breach such other action may be com-
menced after the expiration of the time limited and within six
months after the termination of the first action unless the termina-
tion resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for
failure or neglect to prosecute.
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of
limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have ac-
crued before this act becomes effective.
Explanation of Suggested Changes in § 8.2-725. The
amendments would make it clear in products liability lawsuits
based on breach of implied warranty, (a) that the applicable limi-
tation period is the two-year period mandated in § 8.01-246, and
[Vol. 16:323
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(b) that the "discovery" test prescribed in § 8.01-230, and the
"statute of repose" in § 8.01-243 override the standard U.C.C. pro-
visions of § 8.2-275.
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